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Bank Governance and Performance: A Survey of the Literature 
 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to review the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
relationship between bank governance and performance, providing a comprehensive 
understanding of the existing research and offering guidance for investors and 
regulators on the major points of consensus and disagreement among researchers on 
this issue. 
Although the question of what determines the levels of firms’ performance, with 
special emphasis on the role of the corporate governance, has long been the subject of 
substantial academic research, it gained increased attention in the banking industry in 
the last decade due to a series of financial scandals and, more recently, to the global 
financial crisis. In fact, in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, bank corporate 
governance mechanisms received heightened attention, accompanied by the renewed 
interest in the degree of effectiveness of such mechanisms, and their impact on 
performance. 
Given the vast number of influences on corporate performance, such as the 
numerous characteristics of the board of directors, there is an abundant literature on 
the determinants of performance. Thus, this paper tries to bring together this diverse 
body of knowledge into a coherent whole.  
Banks have unique attributes that interfere with the way in which the usual 
corporate governance mechanisms work. Thus, the main differences between banks 
and non-financial firms, which justify that some of the regularities found in the 
literature on the relationship between a set of corporate governance mechanisms and 
performance do not hold for banks, are also analysed. 
Then, we extensively review the literature on the board of directors and its 
impact on performance in the financial crisis and non-financial crisis periods. Finally, 
we also survey the (very) scarce research on the relationship between board 
characteristics and bank failures. 
 
Keywords: Banks, Corporate Governance, Performance. 
JEL classification: G21; G34.  
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1. Introduction  
Although the need to improve and develop new control mechanisms to 
minimize the dangers associated with the potential conflicts of interests between 
corporate stakeholders has long been advocated, large-scale financial scandals and, in 
particular, the financial crisis have brought into the public domain the issue of the 
weak corporate governance. This has been the particular and notorious case of the 
banking sector. The importance of banks in the economy and the nature of their 
activity,1 as well as the significant costs that the failures in bank governance can 
cause,2 make the analysis of the governance mechanisms in the banking sector 
simultaneously highly specific and important. Moreover, banks also have specific 
governance issues.3 In other words, banks clearly appear to have distinct governance 
structures than non-financial firms.4 “For financial institutions, the scope of 
corporate governance goes beyond the shareholders (equity governance) to include 
debtholders, insurance policy holders and other creditors (debt governance).”5(p.219) 
Many renowned academics, economists, public authorities and several other 
observers have argued that poor corporate governance contributed to, or even caused, 
the collapse of an impressive number of large banks throughout the world. Corporate 
governance is generally defined as the set of mechanisms for addressing agency 
problems and controlling risk within the firm and so, it is not surprising that the 
importance of the effectiveness of corporate practices in the banking sector has been 
much emphasised. For the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,6(p10) “effective 
corporate governance is critical to the proper functioning of the banking sector and 
the economy as a whole. Banks perform a crucial role in the economy by 
intermediating funds from savers and depositors to activities that support enterprise 
and help drive economic growth. Banks’ safety and soundness are key to financial 
stability, and the manner in which they conduct their business, therefore, is central to 
economic health. Governance weaknesses at banks that play a significant role in the 
financial system can result in the transmission of problems across the banking sector 
and the economy as a whole.” 
During the financial crisis the quality of governance gained significantly more 
relevance especially concerning the quality of the board of banks. In fact, boards are 
one of the most important, arguably even the most important, corporate governance 
mechanisms that fulfil the following roles: (1) monitor and evaluate management – 
supervisory role, (2) make managerial decisions such as which projects to undertake 
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and which employees to hire – managerial role and (3) offer valuable advice – 
advisory role. All these are especially important in certain types of firms i  (e.g., 
Andres and Vallelado,1 Coles et al,7 Fama and Jensen,8 Williamson,9 Weisbach,10 
John and Senbet,11 Adams and Mehran,12 Raheja,13 Adams and Ferreira,14 Adams et 
al15 and Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach16). 
The resignations of several top executives (e.g., Charles Prince at Citigroup and 
Stan O’Neal at Merrill Lynch) and the recommendations by several proxy advisors 
against the re-election of the board of some banks (e.g., Citigroup) show that the 
boards are, at least partly, being blamed for their poor performance. The OECD 
Steering Group on Corporate Governance, for instance, defends that board failures in 
financial firms are one of the main causes of the financial crisis, evidencing that 
boards failed to set up appropriate risk strategies and establish suitable metrics to 
monitor its implementation in a timely and effective manner.17 For Francis et al18 (p.40) 
“although weak corporate boards may not be the direct trigger of the current crisis, 
corporate board practices could affect the extent to which firms are vulnerable to the 
financial crisis.” To address fundamental deficiencies in bank corporate governance 
that became apparent during the financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision19 has issued a final set of principles for enhancing sound corporate 
governance practices at banking organisations in a document titled “Principles for 
Enhancing Corporate Governance” in which the board is identified as a vital part of 
banks’ regulatory reforms. It has undoubtedly never been as vital to understand the 
governance of banks and their boards as it is now in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis. 
The existing literature on the relationship between corporate boards and 
performance shows mixed results. One reason commonly cited for the inconclusive 
results is that a significant number of these studies fail to account for the endogeneity 
issue that emerges from the joint determination of board structure and the value of the 
firm.20 “Endogeneity leads to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates that make 
reliable inference virtually impossible.”21(p6) Thus, the findings of the studies that 
examine the board structure-performance relationship must be analysed with caution 
if the empirical methods do not appropriately control for all relevant sources of 
endogeneity.(22) Moreover, the uniqueness of bank governance suggests that the 
                                                 
i Complex firms such as those that operate in multiple segments, are large in size, or have high leverage 
are likely to have greater advising requirements.7 
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effects of boards on bank performance may be different from their effects on non-
financial firms and, thus, worthy of special attention.23  
By surveying the existing literature the main conclusion is that some of the 
regularities found in the research on the relation between corporate governance and 
performance of non-financial firms do not hold for banks, as is the case of board 
independence and board size (e.g., Pathan and Faff,2 Adams24 and Erkens et al25). 
Thus, recommendations on the corporate governance made to other sectors can be 
counterproductive in the banking sector. In addition, we can also infer the following:  
First, although when dealing with board effectiveness most studies exclude 
financial firms from their sample,4, ii  in more recent years, banks and financial 
institutions have been more closely examined and the question of whether better bank 
governance (especially concerning boards) leads to improved bank performance has 
been increased analysed by the literature. iii This research is very relevant. In fact, 
better knowledge on how corporate governance of banks impacts on their 
performance is extremely important as in has policy implications not only at bank-
level (e.g., bank management and shareholders) but also at country-level (e.g., 
regulators, regarding the development and improvement of corporate governance 
codes and best practices recommendations).   
Second, the European context is sparsely analysed by the literature when 
compared to the United States (US) context, being even more scarce the existence of 
European cross-country studies.  
Third, empirical research analysed the relationship between different corporate 
governance mechanisms and bank performance using distinct measures of 
performance:  
 Stock returns;1,2,28-36 
 Tobin’s Q;1,2,4,23,37,38 
 Return on Equity (ROE);23,29,31,37,39-43 
 Return on Assets (ROA);1,4,29,30,37,38,40-44 
 Accounting earnings;28 
                                                 
ii For surveys relating to corporate governance in non-financial firms see, for example, Shleifer and 
Vishny26 and Adams et al.15 
iii Likewise, for de Haan and Vlahu27(p2) although “because of the special nature of financial services, 
most academic papers on corporate governance exclude financial firms from their data and focus on 
non-financial firms”, there is a substantial, but scattered, research on governance of financial 
institutions, which contrast to the claim by Adams and Mehran.4 
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 Cost efficiency;44 
 Profit efficiency rank, cost efficiency rank, non-performing loan ratio 
and costs/assets (total interest plus noninterest expenses divided by 
assets);39 
 Bank losses;45  
 Non-performing assets ratio;30 
 Financial ratios based on CAMELSiv indicators;46  
 Pre-tax operating income, net interest margin, return on average assets 
and return on average equity;2 
 Loan losses, rating changes and the composition of the loan portfolio;47 
 EBIT over total assets;23 
 Likelihood to participate in a bailout programme;34, 48 
 Amount of bailout funds.34  
Additionally, Boyd and Runkle49 examined the relationship between the size of 
banking firms and their performance using as indicator of performance ROE, ROA 
and Tobin’s Q. More recently, in the context of the financial crisis, the literature 
highlighted the role of bank size. Banks have an incentive to grow to a size that, in 
case of misfortune, ensures that they are saved.50 Therefore, they have an interest in 
growing regardless of the risks involved. “Given the potential costs to the economy 
from a large bank failure, governments are very reluctant to let large banking 
institutions fail.”51(p.989) Thus, there are banks that are “too big to fail”. 
Fourth, the impact of board characteristics on bank performance depends on the 
trade-off between the advantages and disadvantages of the monitoring and advising 
roles, the two primary roles performed by the board of directors.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines corporate 
governance and its different perspectives and, briefly, discusses why it should matter. 
Section 3 describes the special features of banks and their implications for corporate 
governance. Section 4 discusses the literature on the relationship between the 
characteristics of the board of directors and bank performance. Although this survey 
focus on banks, occasionally relevant evidence on other financial institutions and non-
financial firms will be discussed, namely for reasons of comparison. Section 5 
                                                 
iv CAMELS is an acronym for capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity and 
sensitivity to market risk. 
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presents a short analysis, due to the scarcity of research to date, of the influence of 




2. Corporate governance definition, different perspectives and importance 
The concept of corporate governance is often used in academic literature and 
public debates concerned with its impact on firms, especially on performance, and 
with the objective of trying to define ideal governance structures. For Shleifer and 
Vishny26(p737) “corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” 
They focus on shareholders by arguing that, contrary to other stakeholders, the former 
have a sunk investment in the company. If the firm runs into financial distress, 
shareholders are likely to lose their investment, whereas other stakeholders can walk 
away with relative easiness. “Because their investment is sunk, shareholders have 
fewer protections from expropriation than the other stakeholders do.”26(p751) In the 
same way, Denis and McConnell52(p2) define corporate governance “as the set of 
mechanisms – both institutional and market-based – that induce the self-interested 
controllers of a company (those that make decisions regarding how the company will 
be operated) to make decisions that maximize the value of the company to its owners 
(the supplies of capital)”, such as, how corporate owners can motivate/encourage 
corporate managers to deliver them a competitive rate of return. 
The standard definition of corporate governance only refers to the protection of 
shareholders’ interests and does not include the defense of other stakeholders’ 
interests. As the managerial decisions impact not only on investors but also on a set of 
stakeholders who have a relationship with the firm, such as employees and depositors 
and regulators (these latter in the case of banks), many have advocated a “stakeholder 
value” rather than a “shareholder value” approach. According to Tirole53(p4) “the 
traditional shareholder approach is too narrow a view of an economic analysis of 
corporate governance.” For Goergen54 putting all the focus on shareholders one 
neglects that other types of stakeholders (e.g., employees) often make sunk 
investments in the firms they deal with. For example, employees specialising their 
human capital in a way that is better adequate to the needs of a specific firm, make 
such capital less marketable to other firms and thus, less valuable. Accordingly, it 
seems that stakeholders other than shareholders are not in a different position and 
should, therefore, be treated in an identical way. John and Senbet11 provide a wider 
definiton of corporate governance, since for them (p.372) “corporate governance 
deals with mechanisms by which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over 
corporate insiders and management such that their interests are protected.” They 
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include as stakeholders not just shareholders but also employees, creditors and other 
interested parties. Similarly for OECD55(p11) “corporate governance involves a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders”, which is one key element that improves a firm’s performance and 
competitiveness. The governance mechanisms can be characterised as internal or 
external,52 being the board of directors one of the main internal mechanisms. Whether 
the governance mechanisms actually serve the purpose of creating value is an issue of 
the utmost importance, with value creation being usually measured through a 
particular set of performance measures. 
The governance of banking firms is different from that of unregulated non-
financial firms.4,12 Furthermore, the problems with poor governance are more severe 
for banks than for non-bank firms and their failures have even more substantial 
costs.56 Due to the specificities of banks and their impact on the stability of the 
financial system,12,57,58 since the onset of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, governments 
worldwide have launched a massive and unprecedented bailout package to support 
banks in distress.59,60 At country-level, regulators are concerned about the impact of 
governance on the performance of banks because the health of the overall economy 
depends upon their performance.12 Indeed, “good corporate governance of banks is of 
a vital concern to banks themselves as well as to the banking supervisors.”61(p411) 
Thus, in addition to shareholders, depositors and other creditors, supervisors and 
regulators have a direct interest in bank performance. Becht et al3(p445) also note that 
“not only shareholders but also depositors, other creditors, transaction 
counterparties, and, in most countries, also the taxpayers, are at risk from banks’ 
activities. It follows that [governance] mechanisms should be in place to protect not 
just the interests of shareholders (the primary focus of much of the literature on 
corporate governance (…) but also the interests of these other constituencies.” As a 
result, the board of directors of a bank is assigned a vital role in the bank’s 
governance structure. This role of the board of directors, in order to ensure sound 
governance, is critical because the fiduciary duties of directors (“duty of care” and 
“duty of loyalty”) expand beyond shareholders.57,v According to Adams and Mehran12 
and Adams,62 boards of financial firms may face more pressure to satisfy non-
                                                 
v Also, Macey and O'Hara57(p93) argue that “to the extent that fiduciary duties lower agency costs by 
reducing the freedom of management to act in its own unconstrained self-interest, such duties will be 
especially valuable devices in the banking context because of the inherent difficulties in monitoring 
banks.” 
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shareholder stakeholders than boards of non-financial firms. Regulators, for instance, 
expect boards to act to guarantee the safety and soundness of the banks, a goal that 
may not necessarily be in shareholders’ best interest.24  
The weak corporate governance in the banking industry is often identified as 
one of the causes of the global financial crisis63 or even its major cause.17 The United 
States Financial Crisis Commission64(pxviii) on its final report concluded that “dramatic 
failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically financial 
institutions were a key cause of this crisis.” In the United Kingdom (UK), David 
Walker was commissioned to recommend measures to enhance board-level 
governance at banks to the government.65 Such recommendations served as a basis for 
the 2010 UK Corporate Governance Code. Also, following the crisis, Corporate 
Governance Codes of several countries worldwide emphasise board characteristics, 
highlighting, amongst others, that: (1) the board should have a size that enables it to 
perform its duties in an efficient manner and (2) board members must have relevant 
experience, knowledge, qualifications, competence and diversity. For example, since 
January 2008, Norway has enforced a gender quota requirement for corporate board 
membership at all public limited liability companies. They are obliged, by law,vi to 
ensure that at least 40% of their board of directors are women. Concerning board 
busyness, in France, Germany and Denmark, for instance, there are limits on the 
number of directorships that directors can hold.vii At the sime time, the empirical 
literature also “defies” some governance principles, as is the case of board 
independence. Although, even before the crisis, the Corporate Governance Codes of 
countries worldwide, as well as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the 
NYSE and Nasdaq exchange listing standards have been promoting board 
independence,viii the empirical evidence points to a different direction. In fact, Erkens 
et al25 find that board independence is associated with worse stock returns of financial 
firms during the crisis and Adams24 reports that banks receiving Troubled Assets 
Relief Program (TARP) funds had more independent boards. Also, Pathan and Faff2 
show that independent directors reduce US bank performance. This suggests that 
independent directors may lack information and may not have the expertise necessary 
                                                 
vi Public Limited Liability Companies Act § 6-11a. 
vii For example, article 100(2) of the German Stock Corporations Act prohibits supervisory board 
members from serving on more than ten supervisory boards of any incorporated companies that are 
legally required to have a supervisory board, although up to five additional directorships are allowable 
for group companies.  
viii Additionally, SOX, NYSE, and Nasdaq have tightened the definition of independent director. 
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to oversee the complex nature of the banking activity. Moreover, Beltratti and Stultz32 
find that banks with a shareholder-friendly board, which are banks that conventional 
wisdom would have considered to be better governed, performed worse during the 
crisis. For them (p.2) “shareholder-friendly boards created more value for 
shareholders through their decisions before the crisis, but during the crisis these 
decisions were associated with poor outcomes that could not be forecasted.” A 
possible explanation is that “banks with more shareholder-friendly boards invested 




3. Why are banks special and how their specificities impact on governance? 
Banks are special financial institutions creating distinct corporate governance 
challenges.37 Consistently with this, for instance, Adams and Mehran12 and Macey 
and O'Hara57 emphasise the importance of taking into consideration differences in 
governance between banking and non-banking. Banks have special characteristics that 
increase corporate governance problems and might reduce the effectiveness of many 
traditional governance mechanisms.3,61,66-68 Specifically, as Adams and Mehran12 and 
Adams62 document, the board of directors of banks differs considerably from those of 
non-financial firms. Caprio and Levine,66 for example, highlight the fact that the role 
of the board is fundamental because neither the small equity and debt holders nor the 
market for corporate control (e.g., takeovers) and market competition can enforce an 
effective governance at banks. Also, for Becht et al3(p438) “the very nature of the 
banking business weakens the traditional corporate governance institutions of board 
and shareholder oversight. Banks have the ability to take on risk very quickly, in a 
way that is not immediately visible to directors or outside investors.”  
There is an abundant literature that examines the particularities of banks that 
make them unique and justify a separate analysis.3,5,12,27,57,61,62,66-73 This can be 
summarized in the following way:  
First, banks are generally more opaque than non-financial firms and their 
activity is more complex. The quality of bank loans as well as the quality of other 
bank’ assets are not readily observable, which makes it difficult to accurately assess 
the risks they bear.61,67,70,74 Also, the complexity of several financial instruments 
makes it more difficult to measure and evalute risks.68,70 During the financial crisis, 
for example, the risk associated with many financial innovations, such as securitized 
products, were not properly understood and managed (e.g., Dell'Ariccia et al75 and 
Carlin et al76). Additionally, the competition among rating agencies for corporate 
customers do not lead to an unbiased assessment of risks as needed by investors.77 To 
worsen this situation, in recent years rating agencies have had to evaluate new and 
complex financial assets for which there existed no record of historical data and no 
appropriate models of risk quantification (see, Buiter78). Moreover, banks can alter 
the risk composition of their assets more quickly than most non-financial 
industries67,73 and such change might not be immediately noticeable to directors or 
outside directors.3,73 Both the complexity and opacity of the banking business 
increases the asymmetry of information1,67,68,70,79 and diminishes the capacity of 
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stakeholders to monitor the decisions of bank managers.1 Even knowledgeable outside 
owners will find monitoring difficult in the presence of these attributes.66 Hence, the 
role of boards as a mechanism for corporate governance of banks takes on particular 
importance in these circumstances. The management of bank opacity and complexity 
“requires a board that not only monitors managers efficiently, but also gives 
managers access to independent and valuable advice to run the bank.”1(p2571) Thus, 
the board becomes a crucial mechanism to monitor and advise managers. In 
particular, bank directors’ specific knowledge of the complexity of the banking 
activity allows them to monitor and advise managers efficiently.1 Additionally, Becht 
et al3(p438) notice that “a multitude of quickly evolving and technically complex 
trading activities need to be monitored by specialists who are in short supply.” 
Second, banks are highly leveraged institutions.3,12,61,80-82 This high leverage 
raises the probability of bank failures61,73 and depositors as well as other debtholders 
will demand a higher risk premium as compensation for the higher risk of 
insolvency.61 Additionally, in the presence of high leverage the conflict of interest 
between shareholders and debtholders interacts with the equity governance in banks.73 
Depositors are the primary claimholders80 in banks, and their interest might differ 
significantly.73 High leverage of banking firms and regulation may also affect the 
ability of external governance mechanisms to solve the governance problems of these 
firms.12 “For example, the absence of an active market for corporate control in the 
banking industry prevents better performing firms from taking over the poorly 
performing ones and removing their boards.”12(p126)  
Third, banks are heavily regulated and supervised.3,61,66,80 Given their role as the 
key players in both the credit and payment systems1,66 and in the economic 
development and the stability of the overall financial system1,73,79 and due to the 
vulnerability of banks to runs61 since, for instance, the effects of individual bank 
failure might be a contagious run on otherwise healthy banks,66 governments tightly 
regulate and supervise banks. For Furfine79(p33) “banks have traditionally been both 
regulated and supervised in order to protect them from failure and to maintain the 
safety and viability of the financial system.” Similarly, for John et al73(p313) “bank 
regulation is justified by the negative externalities that are associated with a bank 
failure.” Thus, well-governed banks are important to the stability of the entire 
financial system. To achieve its goals, the regulator might impose restrictions on the 
banking business such as: (1) limit the investments choices of banks and establish 
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capital requirements73,80 and (2) influence managerial decisions and restrict risk 
choices.61,73 Additionally, the regulator might also impose mandatory standards for 
the quality and attributes of bank governance (e.g. restrictions on the composition of 
the board of directors or limitations on equity ownership concentration). Thus, bank 
regulation can change traditional corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., Andres and 
Vallelado,1 Prowse,69 Laeven and Levine,83 John et al84 and Ellul and Yerramilli85). 
Regulators are one of the main stakeholders, but their goals may collide with those of 
the other stakeholders.86 For Adams and Mehran12 there is, in theory, a conflict of 
interest between the goals of regulators (safety and soundness) and those of 
shareholders (value maximisation). “When a conflict exists between value 
maximisation and the need to support prudent operations, regulators expect boards to 
balance these concerns effectively, by ensuring that bank performance as well as 
safety and soundness are taken into account.” 12(p136) (Moreover, a higher standard of 
accountability for the board of regulated firms may, eventually, hamper the ability to 
attract and retain competent directors, which, in turn, could negatively affect bank 
performance.12  
Although monitoring by regulators may represent an additional governance 
mechanism,ix their presence can also aggravate governance problems.1 For instance, 
regulators might restrict competition and discipline banks by imposing limitations on 
the concentration of ownership,57,66,69 which reduce the role of market forces in the 
market for corporate control.66 Hostile takeovers might discipline managers’ 
behaviour because they increase the threat of managers being removed due to poor 
performance.x The threat of potential hostile takeovers induces managers to act in the 
best interest of shareholders to avoid being fired (in a takeover).89,90 However, the 
imposition, by regulators, of several restrictions on the banking system lowers the 
frequency of hostile takeovers and makes these insufficient to discipline bank 
managers, decreasing the efficiency of the market for corporate control.67,69 
Regulation as well as valuation difficulties also weaken the potential role of the 
market for corporate control.3 In addition, regulators might pursue their own interests 
as a regulator (e.g., Boot and Thakor91). 
                                                 
ix Regulation might also be an additional external governance force that acts at the macroeconomic 
level - in the banking sector as a whole - and at the microeconomic level - in the individual banks 
sphere.87 For example, as part of their efforts to monitor banks, regulators supervise the functioning of 
bank boards.1 
x See, e.g., Scharfstein88 who analyses the disciplinary role of takeovers in the context of asymmetric 
information between shareholders and managers. 
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Fourth, the specific nature of banking makes it susceptible to greater moral 
hazard problems, as is the case of deposit insurance.3,61,70 Deposit insurance, while 
aimed compensating the existence of deficiencies in the monitoring and control of 
banks, exacerbate the particular problems that are inherent in banks’ corporate 
governance.61 When protected, the depositor has little incentive to monitor the bank’s 
activities1 and to withdraw funds if the bank is taking on too much risk. Thus, despite 
the positive effect of deposit insurance on preventing depositor runs, xi  this can 
encourage excessive risk-taking57 and incentive bank shareholders to take on 
inefficient risk.69 The problem of moral hazard is worse in situations where a bank is 
at or near insolvency. “In such a situation, the shareholders have a strong incentive 
to increase risk because they can allocate their losses to third parties while still 
receiving any gains that might result from the risky behavior.”57(p 97) Excessive bank 
size can also exacerbate important moral hazard problems (the issue known as “too-
big-to-fail”).  
In short, on the one hand, banks have specific governance issues, distinct from 
those of non-financial firms, whereas on the other hand, the board of a bank plays a 
critical role in achieving effective governance.2 In the distinct context that involves 
the bank´s activities, the board is a key element in its governance structure.1,12,57,61,66  
 
  
                                                 
xi Deposit insurance is a means to discourage withdrawals of deposits and short-term funding from 
banks that would otherwise be solvent.3 
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4. Characteristics of the board of directors and bank performance 
The relevance of the role of the board of directors has been highlighted by 
abundant literature, media and public debates. Mizruchi92(p433) characterises the board 
as the “ultimate centre of control”, Baysinger and Butler93 notice that “the board of 
directors, which has the power to hire, fire, and compensate senior management 
teams, serves to resolve conflicts of interest among decision makers and residual risk 
bearers” and John and Senbet11(p379) note that “the board of directors is central to 
corporate governance mechanisms in market economies.” Similarly, for Helland and 
Sykuta94(p167) “the basic unit of analysis in corporate governance is the board of 
directors” and for Andres and Vallelado1 the board of directors is one of the main 
governance mechanisms. Pathan and Faff2(p1573) also refers that “a bank’s board plays 
a vital role in achieving effective governance.” Moreover, “the ability of a board to 
recommend appropriate actions and to monitor the implementation of these 
recommendations is likely to determine the financial position of the firm and the 
outcome of a bankruptcy proceeding.”95(p271) Academic research generally recognises 
the following two main roles for boards: a supervisory/monitoring role (e.g., Fama 
and Jensen,8 John and Senbet,11 Raheja,13 Adams and Ferreira,14 Hermalin and 
Weisbach96 and Almazan and Suarez97) where the aim is to monitor and evaluate 
management and an advisory role (e.g., Coles et al,7 Adams and Ferreira,14 Helland 
and Sykuta94 and Coles et al98) the purpose of which is to offer valuable advice, 
namely for key strategic decisions. By bringing expertise and knowledge, the board 
plays an important role in formulating and implementing business strategy. On the 
other hand, the board can oblige management to justify its proposed actions and to 
invoke reasoned arguments to support the options it has chosen, thus, performing a 
monitoring function. In this context, “directors monitor, advise, punish, and 
reward”94(p167) and accordingly “the board exists primarily to hire, fire, monitor, and 
compensate management, all with an eye toward maximizing shareholder value.”52(p2) 
In fact, “the common apex of the decision control systems of organisations (…) is a 
board of directors (…) that ratifies and monitors important decisions and chooses, 
dismisses, and rewards important decision agents.”8(p323) Specifically, bank boards 
play a relevant role in bank governance, either monitoring managers or advising them 
in the design and implementation of strategies.1 
Governance literature defends that boards fulfill their functions of advising and 
monitoring management by choosing board characteristics (e.g. composition and size) 
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adequately.13,14,99 In other words, certain features of boards reflect the motivation and 
ability of directors to effectively perform their supervisory and advisory duties.1 For 
example, “the effect of board size on bank value is a trade-off between advantages 
(monitoring and advising) and disadvantages (coordination, control and decision-
making problems).”1(p2571) Also, “the trade-off perspective on board capabilities 
argues that firms attempt to balance monitoring and advising functions primarily by 
adjusting the proportion of inside versus outside directors.”100 This reseach suggests 
that outside directors contribute mainly to the monitoring role because they are 
independent of management. On the other hand, inside directors contribute primarily 
to the advising function because they have more firm-specific knowledge, critical to 
mitigating problems arising from information asymmetry between the board and 
management. Thus, the effect of board characteristics on performance depends on 
which of the two main roles is more relevant for firms, regarding a specific attribute 
of the board, or, to put it in another way, on the needs of firms for advising vis-à-vis 
monitoring (and vice-versa). 
The board of directors is thus at the centre of the public discussion regarding 
corporate governance reform, in particular concerning how board characteristics 
contribute to performance. Next, we review the literature on the relationship between 
a large number of board attributes and bank performance. 
 
4.1 Board independence and performance 
Board independence and board size are the two board characteristics that have been 
more extensively studied in the US52 in both academic and practitioner work, trying to 
analyse whether and to what extent such characteristics affect performance. On the 
one hand, independent directors, i.e. directors that have no social or business 
relationships with management, xii  are better monitors of management precisely 
because they do not have any connection with management (e.g., Hermalin and 
Weisback20). Also, they are considered more effective supervisors of management 
because they have concerns about their personal reputation,xiii that affects their ability 
to receive additional director appointments.8 On the other hand, “the CEO may 
                                                 
xii For Fernandes and Fich 34(p6) “independent directors are individuals who are not full-time or former 
employees of the bank, relatives of a bank employee, or current or previous consultants of the financial 
institution.” 
xiii Gilson101 supports the importance of director reputation by finding evidence that directors who 
resign from financially distressed firms subsequently serve on fewer boards of other companies 
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choose outside directors who will give good advice and counsel, who can bring 
valuable experience and expertise to the board, and who offer a contrast to the 
perspectives and opinions found within the firm.”102(p590) “In addition, they bring a 
different perspective to bear on problems management faces and thus serve as a 
valuable advisory role.”4(p248) This role is particularly relevant in complex firms 
which have greater advising requirements,7 such as banks. Firms for which firm-
specific knowledge of insiders is relatively important are likely to benefit from greater 
representation of them on the board.7 Theoretically, it has long been recognised that 
the effectiveness of independent directors is limited by their inferior information 
compared to corporate insiders.xiv Thus, in a context of high information asymmetry 
the inclusion of more inside directors may be beneficial, as they have greater specific 
information about the firm’s activities.8 Moreover, the problems associated with 
independent directors’ lack of firm-specific knowledge may also be exacerbated for 
banks because regulatory restrictions may act to limit the pool of directors from which 
they can choose4,12,xv and because the complex nature of their businesses.1,3,24,73 The 
problem of the limitations of the set of directors that banks have at their disposal “is 
likely to get worse the more subsidiaries the BHC [bank holding company] has, as 
each subsidiary must have sufficient directors for its board. If so, these bank-level 
regulations may make it more difficult to detect beneficial effects of large and 
independent boards in BHCs.”4(p247) Additionally, the advising requirements are 
relevant for firms operating in more uncertain environments, namely those that have a 
greater need for specialised knowledge,2 as is the case of banks. In fact, “independent 
directors are less likely to have an in-depth knowledge of the internal workings of the 
banks on whose boards they sit” and “they are also less likely to have the financial 
expertise to understand the complexity of the securitisation processes banks were 
engaging in or to assess the associated risks banks were taking on.”24(p32) In 
comparing board independence between banks and non-financial firms, both in the 
                                                 
xiv  A potential disadvantage of outside directors is that they may lack relevant firm-specific 
information.14 
xv A higher standard of responsibility, requirement and obligations for the board of banks as well a set 
of regulation restrictions, imposed by regulators to ensure the health of the financial system, may, 
eventually, to make it difficult to attract and retain talented directors.12 Also, according to Adams and 
Mehran12(p136) “a higher standard of accountability for bank directors and, arguably, well-defined 
regulatory expectations have led the government to sue directors to recover some of the losses in bank 
failures, particularly during periods of poor economic performance and large numbers of failures.” 
The Government has stepped up its efforts to recover some losses by suing bank directors and, as a 
result, banks are finding it more difficult to keep and recruit board members, because directors fear the 
high risk of sitting on a bank's board.103 
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US and in Europe, empirical literature shows that the percentage of independent 
directors is higher on bank boards than on non-financial firms boards (see John et 
al73). However, the existing literature on the relationship between board independence 
and bank performance shows mixed results: a positive relationship,38,43 a negative 
relationship,2,46 an inverted U-shaped relationship1 and an insignificant 
relationship.4,34,37 Other research shows that such relationship depends on the 
environmental conditions and so, it is sensitive to the economic context. Minton et 
al35 find that board independence is negatively associated with bank performance, 
during the crisis period, but not statistically significant during the 2003–2006 pre-
crisis period. 
Liang et al43 find, for a sample of Chinese banks during the period of 2003–
2010, that the proportion of independent directors has significantly positive impacts 
on both bank performance and asset quality. Similarly, in a cross-country study, 
although it is not the main focus of their paper, García-Meca et al38 show that the 
percentage of independent directors on the board of directors positively impacts on 
performance, measured by Tobin’s Q and, alternatively, by ROA. Also, for a sample 
of 212 US bank holding companies, from 1997 to 2004, Pathan and Skully104 
document that banks benefit from more independent directors when the costs of 
monitoring managers are low. On the contrary, Wang et al46 using a sample of BHCs 
in the US show that the percentage of non-executive directors negatively impacts on 
BHCs' performance, suggesting that they have less understanding of the BHCs’ 
activity. Similarly, Pathan and Faff,2 based on a sample of 212 large US BHCs over 
the period 1997–2011, using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation 
technique, find evidence that banks in which boards have more independent directors 
perform worse. This finding holds during the crisis period. Also, they present 
evidence that the impact of board structure (board independence, board size and 
gender diversity) is prevalent particularly for banks with low market power, exposed 
to external takeovers and/or of smaller size. The negative impact of board 
independence on performance is confirmed during the financial crisis for financial 
firms. Erkens et al,25 using a dataset of 296 financial firms from 30 countries, find 
that firms with more independent directors experienced worse stock returns during the 
crisis period.xvi  Accordingly, Adams24 shows that banks receiving bailout money, in 
                                                 
xvi The explanation for this result is that independent board members may incentive managers to raise 
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particular TARP funds, had boards that were more independent than in other banks. 
Similarly, Minton et al35 find that a more independent board is associated with 
increases in the likelihood of receiving TARP funds. This suggests that board 
independence may not necessarily be beneficial for banks because independent 
directors may not have sufficient expertise to monitor complex banking firms and 
oversee the actions of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO).24 In the crisis period, Aebi 
et al,31 find a negative relation between board independence and US bank 
performance, although it is not always significant. Other empirical research shows a 
non-linear relationship between board independence and bank performance. Andres 
and Vallelado,1 using a sample of large international commercial banks, find an 
inverted U-shaped relation between the proportion of non-executive directors and 
performance. They show that the addition of outsiders improves value, but when a 
critical proportion over the total number of board members is reached, performance 
starts to diminish. Moreover, the existing literature also reports an insignificant 
relationship between independent directors and performance. Staikouras et al,37 for a 
sample of European banks for the period 2002–2004, find that the proportion of non-
executives in the board of directors is positive but statistically insignificant under all 
measures of performance. Also, Adams and Mehran,4 considering a sample of 35 
publicly traded BHCs, find that board independence has no significant relation with 
BHCs’ performance. In the context of the financial crisis, Fernandes and Fich,34 for a 
sample of 479 US banks, show that the percentage of directors classified as 
independent is not statistically related to performance. 
 
4.2 Board size and performance 
An extensive literature analyses board size in banks comparing it with board 
size in non-financial firms and examining whether and how it matters for bank 
performance. Several studies report that banks have larger boards than non-financial 
firms.12,24,65,105,106 For example, Adams and Mehran12 find, in a sample of data on 35 
BHCs in the US from 1986 to 1999, that BHCs have larger boards, more independent 
directors and lower performance-based pay for CEOs than non-financial firms. Also, 
according to the Walker Review,65 the board of listed UK banks in 2007/2008 were 
larger than those of other listed companies, suggesting that bank board size should be 
                                                                                                                                           
more equity capital during the crisis to ensure capital adequacy and reduce bankruptcy risk, which 
leads to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debtholders. 
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reduced because “the overall effectiveness of the board, outside a quite narrow range, 
tends to vary inversely with its size.”65(p41) However for Adams and Mehran12(p127) 
“BHC boards may be larger because of their complex organisational structure.” 
The second question that has been widely examined by the literature is the 
impact of board size on performance. In the research of non-financial firms the most 
common finding is the negative relationship between board size and the performance 
of the firm20 due to the lack of cohesiveness of larger boards as well as their higher 
coordination and communication costs.13,90,107 These costs highlight the difficulty in 
decision-making as board size increases. So, smaller boards should be more effective 
because decision-making costs are lower in smaller groups.24 When boards are larger 
it becomes harder for directors to express their opinions and points of view within the 
restricted time available during the board meetings.107 A larger board size may also 
create a free-riding problem, making it more difficult for board members to have a 
motivation to monitor.13 On large boards, since the incentive of an individual director 
to acquire and understand information as well as to supervise managers is low, it is 
easier for the CEO to control.90,xvii However, Coles et al7 defend that this relationship 
depends on the firm’s complexity. Complex firms (diversified, large or highly 
levered) are more likely to benefit from a larger board of directors. Moreover, 
Raheja13 argues that since optimal board size is a function of the directors’ and the 
firm’s characteristics, a large board may be optimal under certain circumstances.  
For banks, the results on the relation between board size and bank performance 
are again mixed. In fact, the research reports a positive relationship,4,31,38 a negative 
relationship,2,37,43,46 an inverted U-shaped relationship1,30 and no relationship35 
between board size and performance.  
For large US BHCs, from 1965 to 1999, Adams and Mehran4 find that board 
size is positively related to performance. This is consistent with the finding of Coles 
et al7 that performance increases in board size for complex firms. Using a sample of 
159 banks in nine countries, García-Meca et al38 also show that board size has a 
positive impact on performance. Moreover, during the crisis period Aebi et al31 find 
that board size is positively associated with bank performance. However, Minton et 
al35 report that the board size is not significantly related to bank performance both 
                                                 
xvii Since agency problems (such as directors’ free-riding) become more severe as a board becomes 
larger, and thus it is easier for the CEO to influence and control the board, CEO power in decision-
making increases with board size (e.g., Jensen90). 
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during the 2007-2008 financial crisis period and the 2003–2006 pre-crisis period. On 
the other hand, Staikouras et al37 observe a significant negative relationship between 
board size and all performance measures used for European banks. This result also 
holds for US and Chinese samples of banks. Wang et al46 and Pathan and Faff2 find 
that there is a negative impact of board size on US BHC's performance. Also, Liang et 
al43 show that board size negatively impacts on Chinese banks’ performance. They 
also note that this effect is not only statistically significant but also economically 
large. Additionally, larger boards are associated with increases in the likelihood of 
receiving TARP funds.24,35 Furthermore, Andres and Vallelado1 and Grove et al30 find 
an inverted U-shaped relation between board size and commercial banks performance. 
Andres and Vallelado1(p2571) note that although “adding new directors is positively 
linked to a bank’s performance, and indicates better manager monitoring and 
advising, the non-monotonic relation shows that when the number of directors 
reaches 19, Tobin’s Q starts to diminish.” Also, Grove et al30 show that board size 
exhibits a concave relationship with financial performance (measured by ROA of 
2008 and the average of the 2006–2008 period). Additionally, their findings reveal 
that board size has a negative and linear association with financial performance 
(measured by excess stock return of 2007) and loan quality (measured by the non- 
performing assets ratio of 2007, 2008, and the average of the 2006–2008 period). 
 
4.3 CEO duality and performance 
It has long been argued that when the CEO is also the Chairman xviii  the 
motivation of the board to monitor and oversee management is compromised due to a 
lack of independence and conflicts of interests,90 reducing the board’s ability to 
ensure that management pursues the development of activities that create value.  
Supporters of the separation between the roles of CEO and Chairman argue that when 
the CEO is also the Chairman the agency cost are higher as the ability to supervise the 
CEO is reduced – the Entrenchment Theory.8,90,107, xix  This reduction in board 
oversight facilitates the pursuance of the CEO's agenda,109 which may diverge from 
shareholders’ goals and, so, negatively affect the performance of the firm. On the 
                                                 
xviii The literature refers to the combination of the roles of CEO and Chairman of the board as CEO 
duality. So, CEO duality exists when a firm's CEO also serves as Chairman of the board of directors.  
xix  Berger et al108(p1411) define entrenchment “as the extent to which managers fail to experience 
discipline from the full range of corporate governance and control mechanisms, including monitoring 
by the board, the threat of dismissal or takeover, and stock- or compensation-based performance 
incentives.” 
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other hand, advocates of the combination of the two roles defend that the choice of 
board leadership is based on the firm’s economic and business environments so, 
joining both functions in the same individual may be best suited to a firm's conditions 
– the Efficiency Theory.110,111 In this sense, the features of an effective board will 
change as a function of environmental conditions.xx/xxi Accordingly, each firm weighs 
the costs and benefits related to both leadership structures and chooses the one that is 
best suited to its economic and business conditions. In this context, duality may offer 
a clear direction of a single leader and, consequently, a faster response to external 
events, facilitating effective action by the CEO and, thus, leading to higher 
performance. Additionally, Brickley et al110 refer that some costs related to the 
separation of the roles have been overlooked by their advocates. These costs 
incorporate: agency costs of controlling the behaviour of the Chairman, information 
costs and costs associated with inconsistent decision making of shared authority.  
Pi and Timme44 in their research on 112 US banks find that cost efficiency and 
ROA are lower for banks with CEO duality. Similarly, using a sample of 236 US 
public commercial banks, Grove et al30 show that CEO duality is negatively 
associated with financial performance in the pre-crisis period (measured by ROA of 
2006 and 2007 and excess stock returns of 2006 and 2007) but not in the crisis period 
(2008). “This finding is consistent with the suggestion by the financial press that an 
over-powerful CEO was a key factor leading banks into risky strategies that which in 
turn, led to poor firm performance and, as a result, several major banks separated the 
role.”30(p432) Also, Wang et al46 report a negative impact on BHCs performance from 
CEO duality. On the contrary, Aebi et al,31 do not find that CEO duality affects 
performance in their sample of US banks. Additionally, Pathan56 shows that CEO 
power (CEO’s ability to control board decision, including CEO duality) negatively 
affects bank risk-taking because bank managers including CEOs may prefer lower 
risk due to their non-diversifiable wealth, including human capital invested in their 
banks, and comparatively fixed compensation (e.g., salary). 
  
                                                 
xx This idea is supported by studies linking board composition with environmental conditions as is the 
case of Pfeffer112 and Boyd113.  
xxi  According to Brickley et al110 both leadership structures have costs and benefits and it is not 
theoretically obvious which of them is the best. In fact, the “optimal structure is likely to vary 
according to the economic circumstances facing the firm.”110(p218) 
 24 
4.4 Board experience and performance 
The effectiveness of internal control mechanisms in any financial or non-
financial institution relies, in great part, on the monitoring and advising abilities of its 
board of directors. There is a recent and increasing consensus that the strict and 
effective performance of both the monitoring and advisory roles depends on the 
experience of directors,34,45,114 particularly from the point of view of risk 
management.85,xxii A more financially knowledgeable board can identify risks that will 
not pay off or that are unsound for the financial stability and can advise senior 
managers to avoid such risks.35 Alternatively, financial experts can recognise risks 
that are more beneficial to shareholders in normal times and incentive management to 
take on those risks.35 For Hau and Thum45(p719) “effective monitoring of bank 
managers may involve industry-specific knowledge which depends on experience.” 
Following the wave of the accounting scandals in the US and in particular in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, regulators and shareholder activists, among others, 
have stressed the need for more financial and banking experience among directors.xxiii 
The implicit assumption is that this would lead to better board oversight and advice 
and hence, would better serve the interests of shareholders. However, it is often 
asserted that bank board members lack banking and financial experience.17 This 
finding is consistent with Guerrera and Larsen115 who report that more than two-thirds 
of the directors at eight large US financial institutions did not have any significant 
recent experience in the banking business and more than half had no financial services 
industry experience at all.xxiv Further, Fernandes and Fich34 refer that an analysis of 
Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch prior to their collapse shows that their boards of 
directors lacked sufficient financial expertise. In Europe, it seems that banking 
experience is also often quite limited among board members. In the UK, for example, 
Northern Rock, the first bank in 150 years to suffer a bank run and which ended up 
being nationalised in 2008, had just two board members with banking experience.17 
                                                 
xxii Ellul and Yerramilli85, for a sample of 72 BHCs over the 1994 to 2009 period, conclude that board 
experience and their risk management index (RMI) seem to be substitutes as they find that BHCs that 
have a larger fraction of independent directors with prior financial industry experience have lower 
RMI. 
xxiii In the survey “2012, Board practices report: Providing insight into the shape of things to come”, 
elaborated in 2012 by Deloitte and Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals, 47% 
of directors indicate industry experience as the most desired skill for board success in the next two 
years.  
xxiv  Guerrera and Larsen115 also discuss the fact that SOX made it more difficult for financial 
companies to hire financial experts as directors because of the problem of conflicts of interests. 
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Based on this discussion, some recent literature has been investigating the impact of 
directors’ financial expertise on the performance of European and US banks during 
the recent financial crisis.34,45 Hau and Thum,45 examining the biographical 
background of 592 supervisory board members in the 29 largest German banks, 
conclude that the presence of board members with financial experience was 
negatively related to bank losses in the period 2007-2008. Also, their results reveal 
that management and financial experience of the board members are systematically 
higher in privately-owned banks compared to state-owned banks. This “competence 
gap can largely be attributed to an appointment practice for state-owned banks which 
stacks the board with politicians and government employees as the shareholder 
representatives.”45(p726) In fact, “most of the politically-connected board members 
made their career in politics and in administration but have little experience in 
banking and financial markets.”45(p726) Furthermore, in the European context, Cuñat 
and Garicano47 show that Spanish cajas whose chairman had no previous banking 
experience (or no postgraduate education) had significantly worse performance. 
Experienced, and more educated, chairmen performed better both before the crisis (in 
2007) and during the crisis. However, the non-profit nature of the cajas and their 
close link with political institutions make this result difficult to generalise to 
international banks.116 Also, the lack of financial experience of bank board members 
in Germany, much more notorious in public banks, is correlated with the existence of 
political appointments. 
For US banks, Fernandes and Fich34 show that banks with more financially 
experienced board members did better during the crisis, exhibiting better stock return 
performance. In addition, the probability of a bailout as well as the amount of bailout 
funds as a fraction of bank assets decline as the financial experience of outside 
directors increases. Thus, banks with financial experts on their boards are less likely 
to be bailed out and within the banks that receive assistance those with more financial 
experts receive proportionally less assistance. Aebi et al31 also investigate whether 
financial experience influenced US bank performance during the crisis. However, in 
contrast to Fernandes and Fich,34 they report that the percentage of directors with 
experience (present or past) as an executive officer in a bank or insurance company is 
negatively related to performance in all specifications and significant in two of them. 
This negative relationship is consistent with the results of Minton et al.35 For a sample 
of US banks, they find that while financial expertise is weakly related to better 
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performance before the crisis, it is strongly associated with lower performance during 
the crisis. Overall, the results are consistent with independent directors with financial 
expertise supporting increased risk taking prior to the crisis. xxv  Srivastav and 
Hagendorff82(p6) state that “board competence in terms of the educational 
qualifications and prior relevant experience can also have an important bearing on 
bank risk-taking incentives.” Furthermore, Nguyen et al36 analyse how the 
characteristics of executive directors affect the market performance of US banks, 
from January 1999 to December 2011. They show that prior work experience, 
educationxxvi and age create shareholder wealth while gender, non-banking experience 
or an MBA degree do not lead to any measurable value creation. These wealth effects 
are moderated by the level of influence of incoming executives. Their magnitude is 
reduced as bank boards become more independent and is higher if the incoming 
executive is also appointed as CEO. 
One possible explanation for the mixed findings as previously discussed in this 
sub-section is the use of different proxies for financial expertise.27,73  
 
4.5 Board education and performance 
In addition to directors’ banking experience, the qualifications of directors may 
influence bank performance, as a higher educational level leads to better judgments 
on a particular investment strategy and thus, to better corporate decisions. This is 
particularly important in the case of banking firms because the complexity of their 
activity often requires a great amount of specific knowledge. OECD Corporate 
Governance Principles, more specifically “the annotation to Principle VI.E.3 (board 
members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their responsibilities) 
touches on board training and refers that “this might include that board members 
acquire appropriate skills upon appointment (…)””17(p23) Widespread belief that 
director qualifications and experience matter is also reflected in the amendments to 
                                                 
xxv “In stable times, the presence of financial experts among independent directors is associated with 
higher risk taking and slightly above-average performance. Since financial expertise on the board is 
related to more risk taking, it is not surprising that banks with more independent financial experts 
underperform when the crisis hits.”35(p354)  
xxvi Specifically, education is proxied by an Ivy League Education. Nguyen et al36 choose Ivy League 
institutions as an indicator of highly reputable universities. According to them (p.115) “while not a 
perfect proxy for academic excellence, there is empirical evidence showing that Ivy League graduates 
perform better than non-Ivy League ones.” Ivy League institutions are eight northeastern American 
higher education institutions, including Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University, 
Dartmouth College, Harvard University, Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania and Yale 
University. 
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the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s disclosure rules introduced in 
December 2009.117 
Such amendments are intended to improve disclosures regarding risk, corporate 
governance, the qualifications of the directors and compensation. 
However, academic papers emphasise experience rather than qualifications. 
Exceptions are the studies by Nguyen et al,36 Hau and Thum45 and Cuñat and 
Garicano.47 Hau and Thum45 analyse the impact of the educational background of 
supervisory board members on the performance of banks during the financial crisis, 
defining three levels of educational achievement (Business/Economics degree, MBA 
degree and PhD degree in Business/Economics). The results reveal that board’s 
average educational achievement does not show a statistically significant correlation 
with bank losses. In the same way, Nguyen et al36 find that appointing executives 
with an MBA degree is not linked to measurable value effects. In contrast, Cuñat and 
Garicano47 find that cajas whose chairman did not have postgraduate education have 
significantly worse performance. Additionally, Berger et al118 investigate how a set of 
characteristics of executives, such as educational composition, affect the portfolio risk 
of financial institutions. They remove all banks from the sample that were subject to 
regulatory interventions, capital support measures, and distress mergers to obtain a 
clean identification of the impact of changes in board composition on bank risk taking 
in a sample of banks that does not contain seriously troubled institutions. They find 
that when board changes increase the representation of executives holding a Ph.D 
degree the portfolio risk declines, suggesting that such executives apply better risk 
management techniques. 
 
4.6 Board diversity and performance 
The link between board diversity and shareholder value is relatively new, 
although there is literature since the 1990s that support expectations for improved 
performance and increased value for firms that implement diversity initiatives, 
thereby promoting action for managing diversity.119,120 Firms which encourage 
diversity can create competitive advantages in several dimensions of business 
performance: cost, attraction of human resources, marketing success, creativity and 
innovation, problem-solving quality and organisational flexibility.119 Also, wider 
diversity in board member characteristics has been advocated as a means of 
improving organisational performance by providing boards with new insights and 
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perspectives.121 For Fields and Keys122(p13) “a key factor in diversity’s successful 
impact on firm performance is the value found in the heterogeneity of ideas, 
experiences, and innovations that diverse individuals bring to the firm.”  
The rationale behind the view of diversity as a positive force within boards 
builds on the assumption that the existence of multiple and divergent viewpoints 
within a board will decrease the likelihood that the agenda and initiatives will be 
dominated by the CEO and his/her inside director allies, thus improving the 
monitoring role of the board.123 Although board diversity has several dimensions the 
literature reveals a predominance of gender diversity.  
Following the increased attention that gender diversity has received, boards 
around the world are under increasing pressure to choose female directors. In fact, 
many proposals for governance reform explicitly emphasise the importance of gender 
diversity on the board. The most prominent promotion of this kind of diversity took 
place in Norway, where since January 2008 all listed companies must abide by a 40% 
gender quota for female directors or face dissolution.124,125 Most of the national 
legislative initiatives are based on the view that the presence of women on boards 
creates value. Female board directors provide unique perspectives, experiences, and 
work styles as opposed to their male counterparts,126 which can greatly enhance 
deliberations of the board. These attributes will lead to better performance when 
combined with female characteristics such as communication and listening skills.127 
Likewise, Bart and McQueen128 document that female directors can make significant 
contributions to the board due to their higher quality decision-making capability, 
which helps better explain the higher rates of return, more effective risk management 
and even lower rates of bankruptcy when women are present on the board. In 
addition, previous literature documents that female directors are in general better 
prepared than men for board meetings129 and have better attendance records.124 
Moreover, Gul et al130 find that gender diversity improves stock price 
informativeness.  
Although the positive benefits of female directorships have substantial 
empirical support, xxvii  other studies fail to find a significant relationship between 
                                                 
xxvii For instance, Carter et al131 find a significant positive association between the percentage of female 
directors and the performance of firms as measured by Tobin’s Q in a sample of Fortune 1000 firms. 
Barta et al132 evidence that between 2008 and 2010, companies with more diverse top teams were also 
top financial performers. Also, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera133 in Spain and Hutchinson et al134 in 
Australia stress that gender diversity has a positive effect on performance. 
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female directorships and the performance of the firm.18,135-137 The research by Adams 
and Ferreira124 shows that, although female directors are more effective than men in 
monitoring, the average effect of gender diversity on the performance of firms is 
negative. 
In the light of the financial crisis, the link between performance and gender 
diversity has been raised and discussed publicly. Kristof138 noticed the lack of women 
in banks around the world and implicitly suggested that male domination may have 
contributed to their recent poor performance. Similarly, Harriet Harman, at the time, 
the UK Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, laid the blame for the financial meltdown 
on male domination of the top jobs at banks and argued that the financial crisis would 
have been less extreme if Lehman Brothers had been “Lehman Sisters.”139 In addition, 
the European Union commissioner, Michel Barnier suggested that having more 
women on the boards of banks would help prevent the kind of “group-think” that 
exacerbated the crisis.140,xxviii/xxix Accordingly, Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn,141 for a 
dataset of 74 US financial institutions over the period from 1997-2005, find that firms 
with gender diversity will be less likely to engage in subprime lending. Pathan and 
Faff2 show that, although gender diversity improves US bank performance in the pre-
SOX period, the positive effect of gender diminishes in both the post-SOX and the 
crisis periods. Using a sample of banks from different countries (Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US) during the 
period 2004–2010, García-Meca et al38 find that gender diversity improves bank 
performance, confirming the positive role of female directors on the performance of 
banks. On the contrary, Nguyen et al36 show that the gender of executives does not 
affect stock market returns of US banks and thus, according to them, gender does not 
matter. Regarding bank risk-taking, Berger et al118 find that board changes that 
increase the representation of female executives are not conducive to decreasing bank 
risk. Rather, a higher percentage of female board members significantly increases risk 
taking. 
 
                                                 
xxviii According to him, more diversity on boards of banks and other financial institutions, in particular 
more women, is not just one of better gender equality, but also one of better corporate governance. 
xxix  In November 2012, the European Commission proposed legislation that forces publicly listed 
companies in all, at the time, 27 member states, with the exception of small and medium enterprises, to 
reserve at least 40% of their non-executive director board seats for women by 2020. However, this 
legislation aims to accelerate progress towards a better gender balance on the corporate boards and not, 
at least explicitly, corporate governance. 
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National culture has an important impact on executive mindsets, as 
demonstrated by the fact that executives of different cultural background are not 
equally open to change in organisational strategy and leadership profiles142 and in the 
interpretation and response to strategic issues.143 Group members drawn from various 
nationalities tend to differ in ways that have substantial implications for group 
functioning, since national culture has a significant effect on the outlook, perceptions 
and behaviour of individuals.144  
Masulis et al145 argue that firms with foreign independent directors (FID) 
exhibit significantly poorer performance, especially as their business presence in the 
FID’s home region becomes less important. Also, FID display poor board meeting 
attendance records and are associated with a greater likelihood of intentional financial 
misreporting, higher CEO compensation, and a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to 
performance.  
Also, regarding banks, or even financial firms, there is a clear lack of empirical 
studies that examine the link between performance and nationality diversity, with the 
exceptions of the studies by Fernandes and Fich34 and García-Meca et al.38 Fernandes 
and Fich34 find that the ratio of the number of different nationalities of directors to the 
board size, called nationality mix, has no impact on US bank stock returns during the 
crisis. In contrast, García-Meca et al38 document that nationality diversity, measured 
as the percentage of foreign directors, has a negative impact on bank performance, in 
nine countries. However, the percentage of foreign directors on the board may not be 
the best measure to represent nationality diversity, given that a high percentage can be 
obtained by merely having a large number of foreign directors of a single country.  
Additionally, although no study analysing the relationship between age diversity 
and performance has been found, heterogeneity on age is neither significantly related 
to changes in corporate strategy146 nor facilitates innovativeness.147  
 
4.7 Board age and performance 
An individual's age is expected to influence strategic decision-making 
perspectives and choices.146 However, there are mixed views on how the average age 
of a director impacts agency conflicts and, consequently, the firm performance.30  
On the one hand, older directors have more knowledge and experience, which 
might facilitate effective monitoring and attenuate agency costs.30 On the other hand, 
flexibility decreases and rigidity and resistance to change increase as people age.146 
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Also, older directors might lack the incentive and energy to actively monitor 
managers, thereby increasing agency problems.30  
For Child148 younger men are able to expend more physical and mental effort on 
promoting the change and growth of their firms. In this viewpoint, young board 
members will be more vigorous and provide greater continuity into the future than 
will older board members.149 Also, lower managerial age is associated with both risk-
taking and strategic change,146,148 which seems to suggest that young managers are 
inclined to take risks at the expense of shareholders. On the other hand, younger 
managers are likely to have received their education more recently than older 
managers, so their technical knowledge should be superior147 and they have more 
favourable attitudes toward risk-taking.150 In this sense, younger aged boards are more 
likely to have the skills and cognitive resources needed to evaluate risk effectively as 
well as the willingness to take the risks that result in higher returns for shareholders. 
Grove et al,30 regarding US commercial banks, find that average director age 
exhibits a concave relationship with financial performance (measured by ROA of 
2006 and 2007). Their results also reveal that the average director age has a negative 
and linear association with financial performance (measured by excess stock returns 
in 2006). Nguyen et al36 also argue that the age of the executive directors are 
performance relevant. But, contrary to Grove et al,30 they show that the stock market 
returns are positively and significantly related to age. They contend that younger 
appointees have more incentive to raise their job security by engaging in risky and 
value-destroying activities. Therefore, market investors react less favorably to the 
appointment of a young appointee because they predict that this appointment will 
impose additional agency costs to the bank. In addition, Berger et al118 show that bank 
risk taking decreases as board age increases. This effect is statistically significant and 
also economically large. 
 
4.8 Board busyness and performance 
The literature disagrees on the link between the number of directorships held by 
board members and the performance of firms.  
The first strand of literature argues that busy directors should positively affect 
the performance of the firm. Fama and Jensen8 suggest that multiple directorship 
signal director’s abilities/quality. Similarly, Gilson,101 Kaplan and Reishus,151 Ferris 
et al152 and Fich and Shivdasani,153 amongst others, provide additional evidence that 
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multiple directorships certify director quality. In this view, the number of 
directorships held by a director might proxy for reputational capital, with such 
individuals viewed as high quality directors, and higher quality directors are more 
frequently asked to serve on additional boards, Reputational Hypothesis. Thus “the 
directors who are considered “busy” are in fact chosen to be on so many boards 
precisely because of their high ability, which serves to offset the effect of their lack of 
time.”15(p88) 
An alternative view is that directors who serve on many boards “will not be 
able to devote sufficient effort to any one board.”15(p87) Thus, the second strand of 
literature defends that busy outside directors may be less effective monitors. The 
Busyness Hypothesis postulates that serving on too many directorships reduces 
directors’ time and attention, and consequently their ability to monitor management, 
decreasing the value of the firm. Directors with multiple directorships are too busy to 
monitor and advise management.154 While the number of directorships, according to 
some studies, appears to be closely linked to the reputational capital of directors, other 
studies suggest that holding too many directorships may lower the effectiveness of 
outside directors as corporate monitors and decrease firm value (e.g., Loderer and 
Peyer,155 Fich and Shivdasani,156 Jackling and Johl,157 Cashman et al158 and Méndez 
et al159). Accordingly, Loderer and Peyer155 document that seat accumulation is 
negatively related to the value of the firm, possibly because of the conflicts of interest 
that directors are exposed to when they serve on several boards simultaneously and 
the insufficient time they can dedicate to any one of multiple mandates. Likewise, 
Jackling and Johl157 find evidence of a negative effect of busy outside directors on a 
firm's performance, suggesting that “busyness” did not add value in terms of networks 
and improvement of resource accessibility. Busy directors exhibit a higher tendency 
to be absent from board meetings160 and are detrimental to the monitoring capability 
of the board and its committees.159 In the financial crisis period, Francis et al18 find 
that the number of directorships has no impact on the performance of non-financial 
firms. 
Regarding the relationship between board busyness and bank performance, 
Elyasiani and Zhang23 show that the performance of BHCs, for a sample of 116 BHCs 
from 2001 to 2010, is positively related to busyness of directors, supporting the idea 
that busy directors provide better advice due to their valuable knowledge and 
connections. Although busy directors are expected to bring more skills and 
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connections as defended by Elyasiani and Zhang,23 the opaque and complex nature of 
the banking business requires more time and attention from a director in order to 
effectively fulfil the monitoring and advising roles.43 Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn141 
report a positive relationship between outside director busyness and subprime lending, 
from 1997-2005, supporting the view that serving on multiple boards compromises a 
director’s ability to effectively perform monitoring duties. This result is not consistent 
with the finding of Grove et al,30 who find some (weak) evidence that busy directors 
impact on ROA but not on loan quality. In addition, Aebi et al,31 using as measure of 
busy board a dummy variable and Fernandes and Fich,34 using the average number of 
quoted boards positions (other directorships in publicly traded firms) held by board 
members, find that busy directors have no impact on bank performance during the 
financial crisis. 
 
4.9 Board activity and performance 
In the agency framework, the intensity of board activity, measured by the 
frequency of board meetings, may indicate an active monitoring role of corporate 
boards and so, influence corporate performance. Following this view, board meetings 
are beneficial to shareholders. Conger et al161 suggest that board meeting time is an 
important mechanism in improving the effectiveness of boards. The higher the 
frequency of meetings, the greater the supervision of top management, indicating a 
more effective monitoring role, which might mitigate agency costs and subsequently 
improve the performance of the firm.30 “The primary way in which directors obtain 
necessary information is by attending board meetings.”162(p227) An opposing view is 
that board meetings are not necessarily useful because, given their limited time, they 
cannot be used for the meaningful exchange of ideas among directors or with 
management.90 Moreover, routine tasks absorb much of the meetings, thereby limiting 
opportunities for outside directors to meaningfully exercise control over 
management.163 On the one hand, there are costs associated with board meetings, 
including managerial time, travel expenses and meeting fees of directors. On the other 
hand, there are benefits, including more time for directors to confer, define strategy 
and monitor management.  
Andres and Vallelado1 find explanations both for and against a positive relation 
between the frequency of meetings and the performance of banks. Meetings provide 
board members with the opportunity to come together to discuss and exchange ideas 
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on how they intend to monitor managers and bank strategy. Therefore, the more 
frequent the meetings, the closer the control over managers, the more significant the 
advisory role, factors that lead to a positive impact on performance (proactive 
boards). Furthermore, the complexity of the banking business and the importance of 
information require a more active and effective advisory role by boards. Additionally, 
boards of banks tend to be larger and have more committees, which are required to 
meet more frequently in order to be effective.12 However, frequent meetings might 
also be a result of the board’s reaction to poor performance (reactive boards).1  
Although bank directors are strongly urged to attend meetings by regulators, 
Adams and Ferreira,162 in a sample of 5707 directorships from 35 large US BCHs 
over the years 1986–1999, find that bank directors appear to have worse attendance 
records than their counterparts in non-financial firms. “Thus, regulatory pressure per 
se does not appear to be sufficient to induce directors to have good attendance 
records.” 162(p229) Concerning US commercial banks, Grove et al30 show that board 
meeting frequency is positively associated with financial performance during the pre-
crisis period (measured by excess stock return of 2006 and 2007) but not associated 
with loan quality. Also, for large US BHCs Adams and Mehran4 find that the natural 
logarithm of the number of board meetings has no impact on performance. In contrast, 
Liang et al,43 using a sample of 50 largest Chinese banks in the period of 2003–2010, 
find that the number of board meetings has a significantly positive effect on both 
performance and asset quality. The findings support the argument that frequent board 
meetings signal increased supervision of the top bank management in China. Board 
members might play a proactive role in the meetings to discuss and exchange ideas on 
how to supervise and advise managers, which could thereafter enhance bank 
performance. Aebi et al31 specifically analyse the impact of the number of meetings of 
the risk committee on bank performance and they find a positive and significant 
effect. Thus, having a risk committee that meets more frequently positively influences 




5. Board characteristics and bank failures 
To the best of our knowledge, almost no research has empirically examined the 
direct relationship between corporate governance attributes and the failures of banks. 
“Empirically it has been difficult to establish a link between bank failures and 
corporate governance, partly because government rescues have masked the true 
extent of the banks’ problems, and partly because so many other factors have 
contributed to bank failures.”3(p438)  
Bank failures during the crisis have shown that the body of knowledge about 
bank defaults is apparently still not sufficient to prevent large number of banks from 
failing.164 Most research of bank defaults has focused on the impact of accounting 
variables, such as capital ratios (e.g. Martin,165 Pettway and Sinkey,166 Lane et al,167 
Espahbodi,168 Cole and Gunther,169, 170 Helwege,171 Kolari et al,172 Schaeck173 and 
Cole and White174). Berger and Bouwman,175 for example, examine how capital 
affects a bank´s performance (survival and market share) during both financial crises 
(including the recent crisis) and normal times. They conclude that having more capital 
increases the probability of survival of small banks at all times and of medium and 
large banks during banking crises.  
Given the scarcity of research on the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms on bank defaults, we chose in this sub-section, contrary to the previous 
one, to make a joint analysis of the impact of board characteristics on financial 
failures of banks and not to make an analysis of the influence of these characteristics 
one at a time.  
Hambrick and D'Aveni176(p1) characterise bankruptcy as a “protracted process 
of decline” and a “downward spiral”. Therefore, substantial financial distress effects 
are incurred well prior to default.177 “According to the OCC [Office of the 
Comptroller do the Currency], the ultimate causes of bank failures are an uninformed 
or inattentive board of directors and/or management, overly aggressive activity by the 
board and/or management, problems involving the chief executive officer, and other 
problems related to board oversight and management deficiencies.”178(p282)  
The financial distress of banks in the wake of the recent financial crisis has 
triggered a discussion about the role of corporate governance structures in the stability 
of financial institutions. Nevertheless, the finding that corporate governance impacts 
on bank stability, emphasising bank risk-taking behaviour, was already found long 
before the recent financial crisis.  
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Regarding financial distress, for Simpson and Gleason,178 using a sample of 287 
banking firms for the period 1989-1993, board size and the percentage of insiders on 
the board do not impact on the future probability of financial distress, contrary to the 
CEO duality that has a significant effect. Specifically, CEO duality decreases the 
probability of financial distress five years later. 
Concerning board characteristics and their influence on bank failures, Berger et 
al,164 for a sample of US commercial banks during the period of 2007-2010, report 
that the number of outside directors, the number of chief officers, the number of other 
corporate insiders and the board size do not have influence on a bank’s default 
probability, while the CEO duality has a negative impact one year and two years prior 
to default. Thus, they conclude that the management structure of a given bank is not 





Banks remarkably differ from non-financial firms. Due to their particularities 
and their impact on the stability of the financial system and the overall economy, 
failures in bank governance are more critical than failures in unregulated non-
financial firms governance. Thus, we examined how bank governance differs from 
governance in the other type of firms and how governance in banks is conditioned by 
their special attributes. 
During the financial crisis the governance mechanisms gained significantly 
more importance especially concerning the effectiveness of the board of banks, being 
a topic of intense policy discussion. A bank’s board plays a crucial role in achieving 
effective governance. Specifically, it is a key mechanism to supervise managers’ 
behaviour and decisions and to advise them on strategy setting and implementation, 
providing critical resources to the firm (e.g., such as knowledge, networks and 
connections). The role of the board of directors takes on special importance in a 
framework of greater opacity and complexity, intense regulation and higher 
asymmetric information, that characterise banking activity. 
Many academic, economists and policy documents have outlined 
recommendations about banks governance namely about the independence of the 
board of directors. The underlying idea is that numerous characteristics of the board 
impact on directors’ incentives and ability to effectively carry out their duties and, 
consequently, have an impact on performance (and risk-taking). In addition, the effect 
of board characteristics on bank value depends on the trade-off between the 
advantages and disadvantages of monitoring and advising. 
In this paper, we review the vast body of literature devoted to the relationship 
between bank board characteristics and bank performance, in the U.S. setting and in 
international settings (although most studies use data from US, which is more 
abundant) in the crisis and non-crisis periods. The survey suggests that some of the 
empirical findings commonly found in non-financial institutions (e.g. board 
independence and board size) do not hold for banking firms. Several studies show that 
board independence is not positively associated with bank performance. Independent 
directors are not (necessarily) beneficial for banks as they not always have the 
adequate knowledge about the specificities and complexity of the banking business. 
Thus, the costs related to less satisfactory advice seem to outweigh the monitoring 
advantages of independent directors. Similarly, the positive link between board size 
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and bank performance is not found in several studies. Although larger boards are 
advantageous because they increase the pool of expertise and resources available to 
banks, boards with too many members can lead to problems of coordination, control 
and flexibility in the decision-making process. Additionally, for instance, board 
experience is important for bank performance and positively related to it, as 
evidenced by the existing research. Also, the literature stresses that a widespread lack 
of financial expertise on the boards of a large number of banks appears to have played 
a significant role in the recent crisis. 
Finally, we note that the literature on the relationship between board features 
and bank failures is virtually non-existent. Therefore, future work needs to examine 
with much more detail the impact of the corporate governance mechanisms in general 
and board characteristics in particular on bank defaults. The need to acquire 
knowledge about bank failures was particularly clear during the global financial crisis 
(e.g., the imminent default of many banks worldwide forced governments to massive 
and costly interventions in order to ensure their survival).  
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